

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 INR-11 RSC-01 DRC-01 /048 W

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P 270955Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4182

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 11129

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR EA--HABIB FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO JAPAN

1. I WOULD FIND IT VERY HELPFUL IF YOU COULD GET A READING FOR ME FROM BOB INGERSOLL AND THE SECRETARY, AND AT THEIR DISCRETION PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE KIND OF OBJECTIVES WE OURSELVES SHOULD HAVE IN MIND AS WE BEGIN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING WITH THE JAPANESE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JAPAN THIS FALL.

2. FROM MY OWN TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MANY OF HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES, IT IS EVIDENT THAT JAPANESE LEADERS HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE MANY EVIDENCES OF CONCERN AND PRIORITY INTEREST IN JAPAN SHOWN BY THE PRESIDENT. IN PARTICULAR THE EARLY REALIZATION OF THE FIRST VISIT BY A US PRESIDENT-IN-OFFICE WILL BE SEEN IN HISTORIC TERMS BY THE JAPANESE. TANAKA KNOWS THAT SIMPLY HAVING THE PRESIDENT PHYSICALLY IN JAPAN WILL BE A PLUS FOR HIM SO I THINK WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO BE RECEPTIVE TO OUR OWN PREFERENCES ABOUT MANAGING THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE EVENT.

3. IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE TWO FAIRLY DISTINCT CHOICES (WITH OF COURSE VARIOUS INTERMEDIARY SCENARIOS).

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(A) THE "GOOD WILL" VISIT: THIS WOULD AIM FOR A VISIT

DESIGNED TO DOCUMENT THE FACT OF A MATURE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. VISIT UNDER THIS SCENARIO WOULD NOT AIM TO SOLVE PROBLEMS EVEN THOUGH THERE WOULD BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY FOR PRESIDENT AND PM TO EXPRESS THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON MAIN ISSUES OF THE MOMENT. I THINK WE COULD, IF WE SO WISH, PERSUADE TANAKA AND HIS FRIENDS TO PLAN THE VISIT WITHOUT FOCUSING ON PROBLEM-SOLVING AS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE. THIS COULD BE COUPLED WITH SOME REASSURANCES OF U.S. INTENTIONS ON SUCH THINGS AS CONSULTATIONS, BROAD COMMUNICATIONS AND EVEN SUCH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS FLOW OF FOOD SUPPLIES AND COOPERATION ON ENERGY MATTERS. NO SPECIFIC NEW COMMITMENTS WOULD BE ANTICIPATED.

(B) THE ALTERNATIVE CHOICE WOULD BE TO AIM FOR "CONCRETE RESULTS" WITH CEREMONIAL ASPECTS KEPT TO A MINIMUM.

4. THERE ARE SOME ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS:

A. ALTERNATIVE (A) WOULD HAVE THE MOST SALUTARY POLITICAL IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS BY DEMONSTRATING TO OUR TWO PEOPLES AND TO A WATCHING OUTSIDE WORLD THAT IN JAPAN AT LEAST THE U.S. PRESIDENT CAN MAKE A WELL-RECEIVED STATE VISIT WITHOUT HAVING TO SIGN A LIST OF AGREEMENTS ON MATTERS WHICH MAY NOT DESERVE ATTENTION AT SUMMIT LEVEL. ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WOULD REFLECT EXISTENCE OF AN ALREADY HIGH LEVEL OF MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIRM THAT WE'RE ALREADY BY AND LARGE PURSUING QUITE COMMON APPROACHES. A GOOD-WILL STATE VISIT WOULD BE AN ELOQUENT TESTIMONIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL RESULTS OF YEARS OF EFFORT WHICH HAVE BROUGHT OUR RELATIONS TO THE POINT WHERE SUCH A VISIT IS POSSIBLE.

B. ALTERNATIVE (B) WOULD BE EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE ONE ONLY IF THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO CONVEY AN IMAGE AS THE LEADER OF THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRY IN THE WORLD
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WHO IS SOLELY RESULTS-ORIENTED AND ACCORDINGLY CANNOT AFFORD EVEN AS LITTLE AS THREE DAYS IN A NON-PROBLEM-SOLVING MILIEU.

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ACTION EA-14

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4183

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 11129

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- MRN 11129 VICE 11229 --

5. THE BIGGEST PRACTICAL PROBLEM WE SEE IN OPTING FOR
ALTERNATIVE (B), HOWEVER, IS THE DIFFICULTY OF
IDENTIFYING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT ARE BOTH
INTRINSICALLY IMPORTANT ENOUGH AND RPT AND REALISTICALLY
SUSCEPTIBLE OF BEING ADVANCED--AT A BILATERAL SUMMIT
WITH JAPAN--TOWARD AN AGREED COMMON OBJECTIVE. THERE
IS NO SHORTAGE OF ISSUES THAT MEET THE CRITERIA OF
INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE (E.G. INFLATION, MONETARY REFORM,
E-W DETENTE, THE MTN, IMPROVED COOPERATION BETWEEN RAW
MATERIAL PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY
PROBLEMS, ETC) BUT I QUESTION WHETHER THERE WILL BE
ANYWHERE NEAR ENOUGH TIME FOR A MEANINGFUL PROBING OF
OUR RESPECTIVE NEWS ON THESE KINDS OF ISSUES. AT
BEST, I WOULD IMAGINE BOTH SIDES WOULD ONLY BE ABLE
TO ARTICULATE THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS IN A HIGHLY
SUMMARIZED COMMUNIQUE THAT WOULD SERVE
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LEADERS HAD THE WORLD'S
PROBLEMS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THEIR THINKING AND
AGREED TO COOPERATE CLOSELY IN WORKING FOR EQUITABLE
SOLUTIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE BAD, PER SE, BUT
SCHEDULE IS TIGHT AND REACTION TO LIMITED RESULTS
FROM SUCH AN APPROACH MIGHT Demean THE VISIT IN A WORLD
A BIT JADED ABOUT JOINT COMMUNIQUE. IF A VARIANT OF
(B) IS NEEDED, ONE THAT IS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO ME
PERSONALLY WOULD BE TO USE THE SUMMIT TO DEVELOP SOME
NEW AND VISIBLE PROCEDURAL MEANS TO IMPLEMENT OUR OFT-
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EXPRESSED GOOD INTENTIONS TO "CONSULT CLOSELY WITH JAPAN."
THE SINGLE GREATEST FEAR IN THE MINDS OF THE JAPANESE
IS, IN THINK, THEIR REAL OR IMAGINED VULNERABILITY
TO SUDDEN SURPRISE SHIFTS IN U.S. POLICY. WHAT I
HAVE IN MIND IS A POSSIBLE PROCEDURAL INNOVATION
THAT WOULD ESTABLISH A NEW MECHANISM OR CHANNEL OF
CONSULTATION. WHILE WE HAVE NUMEROUS CHANNELS OF
BILATERAL CONSULTATION ALREADY, MOST OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZED ONES (SUCH AS THE PLANNING TALKS
ON POLITICAL MATTERS, ECONCOM ON ECONOMIC MATTERS,
ETC) ARE TOO INFREQUENT TO GIVE THE JAPANESE A SENSE
OF REALLY BEING CONSULTED ABOUT CRUCIAL EVENTS THAT
ARE MOVING TOO FAST FOR THESE FORA. PERHAPS SOME
NEW CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORK COULD BE DEvised THAT
COULD EVEN INCLUDE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS WELL
AND THUS REVIVE THE SECRETARY'S EARLIER PROPOSAL TO
COORDINATE MORE CLOSELY THE POLICIES OF THE THREE
MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREAS OF THE WORLD. (I COULD TRY
TO SPELL THIS OUT A BIT MORE IN A SEPTTEL IF THERE IS
SOME RECEPTIVITY.)

6. ONE COURSE OF ACTION I WISH TO ADVISE AGAINST IS
THE ESCALATION OF QUITE MINOR BILATERAL ISSUES FOR
SUPPOSED SOLUTION AT THE SUMMIT: WE IN FACT HVE NO
PRESSING MAJOR BILATERAL ISSUES OF SUFFICIENT STATURE
TO REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL INTERVENTION WITH JAPAN IN
ORDER TO KEEP OUR RELATIONS ON THEIR PRESENT LARGELY
HARMONIOUS COURSE; MY PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT WE
SHOULD NOT HOLD UP FAIRLY ROUTINE ACTIONS THAT CAN
BE TAKEN AT LOWER LEVELS SIMPLY IN ORDER TO HAVE THE
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER INITIAL A LIST OF SPECIFIC
SUMMIT ACCOMPLISHMENTS. (THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ONE
SIGN THAT THE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACY IS THINKING ALONG
THESE LINES--SEE PARA 4 OF TOKYO'S 10900.)

7. WE STILL HAVE SOME TIME, BUT NOT MUCH, TO TRY TO
STEER JAPANESE THINKING ABOUT THE SUMMIT IN A
DIRECTION MOST CONDUCIVE TO OUR OWN. ANY GUIDANCE
YOU CAN GIVE ME WILL HELP ENSURE WE ARE NOT GIVING
DIFFERENT SIGNALS IN WASHINGTON AND HERE. WHILE I
AM SURE I CAN LIVE WITH ANY SCENARIO FOR THE SUMMIT
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YOU AND OTHERS ON THE 7TH FLOOR MAY RECOMMEND TO THE
PRESIDENT, MY OWN PERSONAL PREFERENCE AT THE MOMENT
IS FOR ALTERNATIVE (A) ABOVE OR SOMETHING QUITE
CLOSE TO IT. PUBLIC REACTIONS THUS FAR TO ANNOUNCEMENT
OF PRESIDENTIAL VISIT HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE

AND NO OVERT OPPOSITION HAS MATERIALIZED. IN
PLANNING VISIT, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND
TANAKA'S WEAKENED POSITION WITHIN LDP. SPECIFIC
AGREEMENTS AT SUMMIT , WHATEVER THEIR CONTENT OR
INTRINSIC MERITS, COULD BE SEIZED UPON BY OPPOSITION
FORCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LDP TO ATTACK TANAKA.
WE HAVE A VALUABLE ALLY IN JAPAN AND THE ABSENCE OF
MOMENTOUS BILATERAL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN US
SHOULD ENABLE A STATE VISIT TO MAKE AN IMMENSE
CONTRIBUTION TO A CONTINUATION OF EXCELLENT RELATIONS
WITH JAPAN FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.
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